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The Judicial Council Movement. Woodrow Wilson wrote that no
government is better than its courts, to which ex-President Taft replied
that our judicial failure has been more outstanding than our failure in
municipal government. The task of making our courts as efficient as
possible is thus both an important and an urgent one.
Many factors have contributed to the present charges of inefficiency,
but none perhaps of greater weight than that of delay. This has been
particularly true of the larger cities, with their principal trial courts
as much as two years behind in their work. The jury system, both in its
expense and delays and in its freedom from control by the courts, has
been a frequent source of complaint. English and Canadian writers
have been telling us that their juries are generally selected in a few
minutes, and that almost never does it take more than half an hour.
Having impanelled the jury, the case is disposed of expeditiously, even
murder cases consuming but three or four days at most. In Detroit, a
murder case was called just as a judge of the Ontario High Court
arrived to hold the assize court directly across the river. The Canadian
judge tried nearly thirty contested cases, divided equally between
criminal and civil actions, sent nine persons to the penitentiary, and
adjourned court while in Detroit the jury was still incomplete.
Such comparisons are anything but complimentary to our courts and
their procedure. Business has been driven to a realization that even a
lean settlement is to be preferred to a law-suit. Substitutes for court
action are being found not only in commercial arbitration, but also in
administrative boards and commissions. Charges are heard that the
rapid expansion of the scope of administrative activity is "standing
proof of the inability of our unorganized and decentralized judicial
systems to expand to meet modern needs." Dean Pound has expressed
fear lest, in the wake of the administrative board, "nothing of impor-
tance be left to the courts." Although it may well be that commissions
have a more fundamental place to fill than merely to supersede court
action, the fact that their development has been hastened by the in-
ability of the courts to keep pace with the social system seems incon-
testable.
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In no other country of the world is so great a force maintained for a
given amount of litigation. Yet, in frantic efforts to enable the courts
to keep up with their work, we continue to add judge after judge to the
bench, only to find that the defects are more fundamental than can be
solved by mere numbers. Early in the present century a concerted
movement was started to find ways for the more efficient utilization of
the existing judicial machinery. One of the most promising products of
this movement is the judicial council.
English Court Administration. Our state and federal judicial systems
were founded upon the concepts of independence and localism. Not
only were the courts rendered independent of the other departments of
government, but each court was made largelyindependent of the others.
As expressed by Chief Justice Taft, each judge was free to paddle his
own canoe. This independence was further enhanced by the second
concept, whereby the courts of each section were virtually distinct from
those of the rest of the state or nation. The problem that had to be met
was how to knit this mass of courts into a unified whole, and to provide
some sort of effective administrative supervision. Above all, a need was
felt for some agency whose duty it would be to make a continuous
study of the working of the courts, and to advise as to changes that
must of necessity be made from time to time. Leaders of bench and
bar alike agreed with Judge Cardozo that the absence of some such
agency was "one of the anomalies of our legal institutions."
In opening the crusade for a more scientific administration of our
courts, Roscoe Pound had called the attention of the legal profession to
the advantages of the modern English court organization and pro-
cedure.' The conspicuous success of the English reforms, as contrasted
with our own half-hearted measures, gave.promise of a solution. It was
but natural that we should turn to them for guidance.
The first glance was singularly disappointing. England has rejected
both of the traditions of our court system, and has clung instead to
centralized authority within a centralized court. We have no official
comparable to the Lord Chancellor, who not only is the true head of all
the courts of England and Wales, but also knits together the courts, the
cabinet, and Parliament. It was obvious that nothing approaching the
English system of organization could be secured without thorough-
going amendment of our constitutions; and even then, to secure an
I "The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,"
29 Am. Bar Assoc. Rep. 395 (1906).
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official occupying the position of a Lord Chancellor was, for the time
at least, out of the question. But it was equally obvious that the secur-
ing of many of the essentials of the English reforms, such as the mobility
of judges and a simplified procedure, need not wait for such a change.
We took another look, and our eye fell upon the Rules Committee.
This committee is one of the outstanding contributions of the English
reforms to judicial organization, and its success in guiding the develop-
ment of a business-like procedure is still the marvel of the common
law lawyer. Here we saw a small council, made up of nisi prius as well
as appellate judges, and since 1894 of practicing lawyers as well, proving
its worth as an executive agency in one of the most important fields of
judicial administration. Why not adapt such a committee to the wider
demands of our own court systems? The idea seemed practicable, and
it appeared to fit in with the proposals of the leaders for reform.
Judicial Councils Established. It would seem that this movement did
not bear definite fruit until 1922, when Ohio provided for the first
modern judicial council, and the federal government set up a Board of
Senior Circuit Judges. As early as 1913 Wisconsin had established a
Board of Circuit Judges, made up of all of the principal nisi prius
judges of the state. This board, which has met annually since that
date, has instituted various reforms in practice and procedure. Through
the power of the chairman to "request judges whose calendars are not
congested to assist those judges whose calendars are congested," it has
been instrumental in equalizing the work of the courts and, except in
Milwaukee, in keeping them well up with their work. But the Wiscon-
sin experiment does not seem to have attracted the immediate attention
of the other states.
Two years later New Jersey and Colorado, the first by statute, the
second by order of the supreme court, set up councils to recommend
changes in the rules of practice and procedure. Neither was given
administrative powers, and the scope of their activity was too restricted
to satisfy the needs of the situation. Neither has been active, and the
Colorado council, although still maintaining a paper existence, has
lapsed into a state of complete desuetude.
In 1919 the legislatures of two states, Massachusetts and Oregon,
appointed commissions to study the entire field of judicial organization
and to recommend ways and means of improvement. The Massachu-
setts commission stated that "it is not a good business arrangement
for the commonwealth to leave the study of the judicial system and
the formulation of suggestions for its development almost entirely to
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the casual interest of individuals," and recommended the establish-
ment of a permanent official body, composed of lawyers and judges, to
perform these functions. Chairman Carey of the Oregon commission
made a similar suggestion.
Neither legislature acted at the time, and Ohio stepped in to establish
what is generally spoken of as the first judicial council. A statute of
1922 made provision for a council consisting of four judges of appellate
courts, two nisi prius judges, and three practicing attorneys, the chief
justice of the supreme court being chairman. The council is required
to render biennial reports to the legislature, in addition to submitting
suggestions from time to time for the consideration of the judges of the
various courts. Power is given the council to compel witnesses to
appear and testify, and to require the clerks of the various courts to
render periodic reports. The statute is one of the most complete and
best drafted of all the judicial council acts, but the legislature has
always failed to make the necessary appropriations for expenses. The
chief justice reports that consequently the council "has never func-
tioned except in the most perfunctory way..... We [the members of
the council] have felt that it is useless to try to do anything without
funds, and we have also felt that it was hardly the proper thing to
solicit private funds, fearing that the people, and perhapsthelegislature
as well, would feel that anything that might be recommended by the
council would reflect the notions of those who had contributed to its
expenses."' The council has never made a report to the legislature, and
has made but few suggestions to the judges of the various courts.
In spite of the failure of the Ohio act, the year 1922 did not pass
without a definite advance being made. Ex-President Taft, always a
leader in the movement for judicial reform, now enjoyed the added
prestige that accompanies our highest judicial office. In 1914 he had
proposed that "authority and duty should be conferred upon the head
of the federal judicial system, either the Chief Justice or a council of
judges appointed by him, or by the Supreme Court, to consider each
year the pending federal judicial business of the country and to dis-
tribute the federal judicial force . . . . through the various districts and
intermediate appellate courts" in accordance with the amount of busi-
ness to be done.' It is clear that the essentials of his proposal were the
mobility of judges and some sort of administrative control to make this
I Letter from Carrington T. Marshall, president of the council, dated August
18, 1928.
* "Attacks on the Courts and Legal Procedure," 5 Ky. L. Jour. 14-15.
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mobility effective; precisely what sort of body should wield this control
was of less immediate importance. When the Senate bill of 1921 to
provide for additional judges was amended to provide for a Conference
of Senior Circuit Judges, the Chief Justice immediately threw his in-
fluence behind the bill.' Its passage in the latter part of 1922 marks one
of the most forward-looking steps yet taken by Congress for the unifica-
tion and efficiency of the federal courts. The provision for the mobility
of district judges, under the supervision of the Chief Justice and the
senior circuit judges, runs counter to the traditions both of independ-
ence and localism, and would appear to indicate a turning point in our
federal court system. Many writers have refused to recognize the Con-
ference as a judicial council because it is composed solely of appellate
judges, neither the nisi prius courts nor the bar being represented.
However this may be, it has undertaken the work of such a council and
is entitled to rank beside the most successful of them.5
With the impetus given by the federal and Ohio acts, agitation for
the creation of judicial councils bore fruit in a number of states. In
1923 Oregon established a small council of five, two appellate and three
nisi prius judges. The next year Massachusetts created a council
numbering four attorneys among its nine members. These were fol-
lowed a year later by California6 and Washington, and in 1927 Con-
necticut, Kansas, and Rhode Island completed the list to date. North
Carolina and North Dakota followed the Wisconsin plan of a confer-
ence of all the judges from the principal courts of the state.
Composition. Except for the federal Conference, which contains only
appellate judges, and those states which have adopted a general con-
ference of judges rather than a representative committee, the composi-
tion of the judicial councils now existing is fairly uniform. Their size
varies from five members in Oregon to eleven in California, nine being
the most favored number. In each case the final court of appeals is
allotted from one to three members, the nisi prius courts from two to
six. Ohio and California allot one and three seats, respectively, to
their intermediate appellate courts. All but two states, Oregon and
California, provide for membership of practicing attorneys who hold
' It is possible that the proposal for the Conference originated with him.
See the statement of Representative Walsh in the House, 62 Cong. Rec. 202.
5 At the time when the bill was passed the Chief Justice was also favoring
a mixed council of judges and attorneys to regulate practice and procedure.
See 6 Jour. Am. Jud. Soc. 36, 46.
* Constitutional amendment in effect November 2, 1926.
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no judicial office,7 and Connecticut and Rhode Island add a prosecuting
attorney. Two of the most recent acts, those of Kansas and Washing-
ton, give membership to the chairmen of the judiciary committees of
the legislature.
The judicial members of the council who are not expressly desig-
nated by statute are almost universally appointed by the chief justice,
whereas in Ohio, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island the
governor appoints the practitioners. Except in Massachusetts and
Kansas, where the council selects its own chairman, the chief justice or
his representative is ex officio chairman of the council.
Powers. The natural hesitancy on the part of the legislature to
bestow extensive authority upon a new type of agency has restricted
most judicial councils to fact-finding and recommending powers. Aside
from their powers in connection with fact-finding,8 most of the councils
have no authority to issue mandatory orders to any judge or court
official. Their functions may be summarized as follows: (1) to conduct
a continuous survey of the volume and condition of business in the
various courts, the work accomplished, and the character of the results;
(2) to devise ways of simplifying judicial procedure and improving the
administration of justice; (3) to acquaint all courts with the results of
various experiments in other jurisdictions, and to foster the adoption
of such changes as seem in the interest of uniformity and the expedition
of business; (4) to bring to the attention of the political departments of
the government all problems which cannot be solved except by amend-
ment of the laws or constitution; and (5) to conduct such special in-
vestigations as the legislature or governor may desire, and to act as an
advisory body on such bills as shall be submitted for the council's con-
sideration.
A few councils have been given additional powers. The California
council has control over the assignment of judges to care for crowded
calendars. The Wisconsin and federal conferences, through their chair-
7 The Oregon council, in its 1926 report, recommended that two practicing
attorneys and one prosecuting attorney be added to the council, as well as the
chairmen of the judiciary committees of the legislature. The California council
contains one justice of the peace, who is, of course, primarily engaged in the
practice of law. R. H. Phillips, secretary of the Connecticut council, reports
that "without active practitioners on it, the council would not function."
8 Nearly all can require reports of various court officials, and a few of any
government officer. An amendment giving such authority was found necessary
in California, where its absence seriously handicapped the council in its initial
work. Several can compel witnesses to testify and produce books and documents.
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men, enjoy similar powers. In addition, the California council has a
wide rule-making power to supplement the statutes on practice and
procedure. These three, two of which we have mentioned as being
frequently classed as other than judicial councils, stand out from the
rest as to the scope of their authority.
Accomplishments. To generalize in regard to the activities of the
different judicial councils is an impossible task. As in all new under-
takings, it is the aggressive spirit of one or a few that counts, over and
above mere paper organization. Several of the councils are only getting
under way, and it is too early to pass judgment upon their work. Others
appear to have failed to take the first steps. The Oregon council was
inactive for two years because of lack of funds. For the same reason the
Ohio council, after more than six years of statutory life, has not yet set
about its tasks. On the other hand, we find the Massachusetts council
holding fortnightly, or even weekly, meetings throughout the year, and
the California council devoting the full time of one member to its work,
he being relieved of his regular judicial duties. The potential value of
the judicial council has been well established by the accomplishments of
these more active groups.
Assignment of Judges. When the California council was organized
in November, 1926, it felt that its first task should be to survey the
judicial business of the state. Judge Hollzer was released from his
duties as judge of the Superior Court and devoted his entire time to
supervising this work. The results revealed some startling inequalities
in the division of labor between the different nisi prius judges. Whereas
those of the metropolitan districts were constantly falling farther be-
hind in their work, some of the judges in the outlying districts tried as
few as six cases in a year. The judicial council act provided a remedy
for this condition through the mobility of judges, and the council took
immediate advantage of this provision.
During the year 1927 nearly 800 assignments of judges were made,
chiefly for the trial of cases in the superior courts, which are the prin-
cipal nisi prius courts of the state. The same procedure has been fol-
lowed during the current year. When the council was first organized,
the Los Angeles courts were nearly two years behind in their work.
Today, without impeding the work of the outlying districts, civil cases
are being tried within ninety days and criminal trials are heard less
than three weeks after the entry of the defendant's plea. Cases are now
being disposed of at a faster rate than they are set for trial. The de-
crease in the number of cases filed seems to show that this healthy
942
HeinOnline  -- 22 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 942 1928
JUDICIAL ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE
condition of the calendar has produced many settlements and dismiss-
als, and has reduced to a minimum the opportunities of defending
merely for purposes of delay.'
The more complete utilization of the trial court personnel placed an
added burden upon an already overworked system of appellate courts.
By assigning judges of the superior court to the district courts of appeal,
a far greater number of appeals was determined than ever before, and
these tribunals were prevented from falling even more in arrears.
The problem of still further relief for the appellate courts has recently
occupied the attention of the council, and a constitutional amendment
has been prepared which will permit substantial changes in their
jurisdiction.
Similar control over the assignment of judges has also aided the
federal and Wisconsin councils in relieving court congestion. Chief
Justice Taft has referred to such mobility as "a change that ought to be
made in every state."10 Its success when under the supervision of a
judicial council is in striking contrast to its almost negligible influence
when left to the individual judge to arrange under a system of reci-
procity.
Master Calendar. Through the master calendar the California council
is doing for the judge of the busy jurisdiction what the assignment plan
does for those of the outlying districts. Under this plan the separate
calendars of each department are abolished and a single central calen-
dar substituted. As a judge finishes a case he calls the main office,
and the next case on the master calendar is sent to him for trial. In
this way the full time of each judge is utilized, and the possibility of
a case not being reached on the date set is reduced. The fact that
neither parties nor judge know who will try a given case is felt to be
not without its advantages.
This plan was first tried in San Diego and Los Angeles. Six months'
experience established its usefulness, and early last August, by an
order of the council, it went into effect in every superior court of the
* A similar experience in Detroit seems to bear out the conclusion that the
number of suits formerly contested for purposes of delay exceeds those now
brought because of the certainty of a speedy trial. The Detroit circuit court,
feeling that many appeals from justices' courts were taken only for delay, decided
to try such cases in the inverse order of their appeal, thus keeping the current
appeals to date. Since the city was growing, an increased number of appeals
would normally be expected. Instead, the number taken fell off nearly one half.
10 Quoted by Chief Justice Waste, "One Year of the Judicial Council,"
Cal. St. Bar Jour., Jan., 1928.
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state having two or more judges. The plan seems elementary, yet the
fact remains that it took a judicial council to bring it into effective
state-wide operation. There are many other jurisdictions where it
could be used to advantage, and where a judicial council, charged
with finding out what other states are doing, could hasten its adoption.
Practice and Procedure. The California council is the only one thus
far given any appreciable measure of direct control over the practice
and procedure of the courts. New sets of rules governing the trial of
cases in both the superior and appellate courts went into effect last
August and September, and are expected greatly to facilitate the
business of those courts. Other proposals, involving the amendment
or repeal of existing statutes, will be placed before the next session
of the legislature in January. The promptness and thoroughness with
which the council has entered upon this work, as compared with the
hesitancy or total lack of activity on the part of the various supreme
courts that have been vested with such powers, raises an interesting
question as to the future of the judicial council as a rules committee.
Even in the absence of authority to make binding rules of practice
and procedure, many councils have not been without beneficial influ-
ence in these fields. We have recently witnessed an outstanding exam-
ple in the federal courts. When the Fall-Sinclair jury was dismissed
because of jury tampering, we took it for granted that we were to
witness another of our now famous scandals of the drawn-out exam-
ination of prospective jurors on the voir dire. We were surprised, on
picking up the morning paper, to find that the jury was already
impanelled and the case ready to proceed. The court had merely
adopted the suggestion of the Board of Senior Circuit Judges that
"the examination of prospective jurors shall be by the judge alone."
Other recommendations by various councils, although attracting less
attention at the moment, are even more promising of future better-
ment.
Statistics. "Everyone who has attempted to deal with the question
of delays in the administration of justice has found his path obstructed
by a mass of unintelligible statistics in respect to the exact condition
of the dockets and the real business of the courts."n This condition
blocks the solution of many defects, and even prevents agreement
as to the presence or absence of the defects themselves. It fosters
vague accusations and unworkable proposals for change. If the
n1 Report of the Fifth Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, Rep. Atty. Gen.
(1926), 5, 7.
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judicial council movement does nothing but furnish us with an expert
and efficient fact-finding body, it will be well worth its cost. A well
developed system of judicial statistics, such as that found today in
England, is not to be had for the asking, and its acquisition will be
one of the most difficult assignments for our councils to fulfill. Many
of them have entered upon the task wholeheartedly, and the results
thus far accomplished, considering the short time and limited funds
available, are encouraging.
One of the greatest defects of the past has been that most juris-
dictions were unacquainted with what other states and foreign coun-
tries were doing. The judicial council is furnishing a clearing house
for exchanging and utilizing such information. Several councils have
felt that first-hand contact with the work of other jurisdictions is the
most valuable. Soon after organizing, the Massachusetts council
sent one of its members to England to study court organization and
procedure. His report has been the basis of many successful reforms.
The recently organized council of Connecticut has sent a prominent
member of the bar to study English appellate procedure. One of the
most promising investigations is the recent survey, made by the
California council, of the methods of court administration and the
practice and procedure of the principal metropolitan centers of the
United States. At the suggestion of Governor Young, correspondence
was supplemented by a two-months' survey tour by a member of the
council which carried him into the principal cities of the East and
Middle West, as well as certain portions of Canada. The results of
this survey are now being compiled, and will be published by the
end of the present year. It should prove valuable, not only to California,
but to other jurisdictions as well.
Advisory Body on Legislation. Although no attempt is here made to
give a complete account of the activities of our various judicial councils,
mention must be made of their value as advisory bodies on legislation.
Several state legislatures have apparently adopted the regular practice
of referring all important bills dealing with the courts to the judicial
council. At the request of the legislature or the governor, various
special investigations have been undertaken as a basis for future
legislation. Many important statutes have been completely drafted
by them. Such a permanent official body, intimately acquainted
with what the courts are doing and trying to do, would seem to be
the logical agency for such work.
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Expense. The charge of excessive cost can scarcely be brought
against the judicial council. Many councils have been seriously handi-
capped in their work by lack of funds. Most of them are working
under appropriations of $500 to $1,000 a year, which, although suffi-
cient for minor undertakings, make impossible the extensive surveys
that conditions would seem to require. The activity of the California
council is no doubt to be explained largely by the fact that the gover-
nor and legislature have placed $50,000 at the body's disposal for
two years' work. Unless the results fall far short of present indications,
the saving to the state will be greatly in excess of this sum, and should
give impetus to other states to follow a similar course.
J. A. C. GRANT.
University of Wisconsin.
The Justice of the Peace-Recent Tendencies. The justice of the
peace system exists today in every one of the forty-eight states. It
was a product of a type of civilization in which such an arrangement
for the trial of petty cases seemed appropriate. Increased population,
the construction of modern highways, the development of means of
transportation and communication, the establishment of a more
definite system of legal principles and rules-all these have contributed
to remove the conditions that formerly made justices of the peace
necessary in every community. In recent years there has been much
discussion and some action looking to the curtailment or the abolition
of justices of the peace courts, but there has been little outright aboli-
tion of the justices courts in rural communities.' The decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in the Turney case' has served
to direct attention to the defects of the justice of the peace system.
An examination of the constitutions of the forty-eight states
reveals the fact that the provisions concerning justices of the peace
may be grouped in reasonably definite classes, first, with respect to
legislative control over the office as such, and secondly, with respect
to legislative control over the jurisdiction of the justices.'
1 "The Passing of the Justice of the Peace," 12 Virginia Law Register 110
(1926); County Government in Virginia, prepared by the N. Y. Bureau of Munici-
pal Research (January, 1927), pp. 48-50; Constitutional Convention Bulletins
Illinois (1920), pp. 762-764; "County Government and Administration in
Iowa," Applied History (1925), pp. 322-330.
2 Tumey v. Ohio, 47 U. S. 437 (1927).
* Chester H. Smith, "The Justice of the Peace System in the United States,"
15 Cal. Law Review, 118-141 (1926-27).
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The types of provisions relating to legislative control over the office
of justice of the peace as such are: (1) those which provide expressly
that the judicial power shall be vested in designated courts of which
the justice of the peace is one,4 (2) those which provide that the judicial
power of the state shall be vested in such inferior courts as may be
established by law, and in which the justice of the peace is not men-
tioned, (3) those which provide that the judicial power of the state
shall be vested in such courts as may be established by law, and further
provide that a competent number of justices of the peace shall be
appointed or elected,' and .(4) those which provide expressly for the
justice of the peace as one of the courts of the state, but which provide
further that the legislature may abolish the office of justice of the
peace throughout the state, or which permit such abolition.7
The types of provisions relating to legislative control over the juris-
diction of justices of the peace are: (1) those which definitely specify
the jurisdiction,8 (2) those which provide that the legislature may fix
the jurisdiction, but not to exceed a specified limit, which is expressly
stated,9 (3) those which provide specifically that the legislature may
fix the jurisdiction,o and (4) those which imply that the legislature
may exercise this power." Some of the constitutional provisions in
regard to jurisdiction fall in one classification for civil cases and
another for criminal trials, but, by and large, the classification as
given includes both types of jurisdiction.
' Ariz., Ark., Del., Fla., Ga., Idaho, Ill., Kans., Ky., Md., Mich., Minn.,
Miss., Mo., Mont., Nev., N. Mex., N. C., Okla., Oregon, S. D., Tenn., Texas,
Utah, Wash., W. Va., Wis., Wyo.
5 California.
6 Ala., Colo., Conn., Iowa, Ind., Me., N. H., N. Y., Ohio, Pa., R. I., S. C., Vt.
7 La., Neb., N. J., N. D., Va. The North Dakota constitution (1913), Sec.
112, reads: "The legislative assembly shall have power to abolish the office of
justice of the peace and confer that jurisdiction upon judges of county courts
or elsewhere." The Massachusetts constitution (1780) contains provisions with
reference to tenure of office (Ch. 111, Art. iii) and removals (Amends., Art.
XXXVII) of justices of the peace, and nothing more. On jurisdiction, see 3 Pick.
(Mass.), 508 (1827).
8 Ala., Ark., Fla., Ga., Ia., Miss., N. M., N. C., N. D., Tex., W. Va., Wyo.
* Ariz., Cal., Colo., Idaho, Mich., Minn., Mont. Neb., Nev., N. H., S. C.,
S. D., Utah.
10 Conn., Del., Ill., Ind., Kans., Ky., La., Md., Mo., N. J., Okla., Ore., Pa.,
R. I., Tenn., Va., Wash., Wis.
1x The office is created by constitutional provision, but with no provision
for jurisdiction, in Maine, Mass., N. Y., Ohio, Vt.
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To abolish outright, then, the office of justice of the peace would
require in most states a change in the constitution; in a minority of
states legislative enactment would suffice. But no state has abolished
the system throughout its bounds, and in only a few states has any
serious suggestion to this end been made. In the Louisiana consti-
tutional convention of 1921 an attempt was made to abolish the office
throughout the state, but the argument that it was a poor man's
court fulfilling the needs of rural communities prevailed; hence,
instead of abolishing the justices courts, a provision was adopted
which gives the legislature complete power over these courts, even
the power to abolish them.
The question of fee compensation for minor courts has been the
subject of legislation in some states. Justices of the peace in California
are paid by salary. 2 All minor courts in Nevada and Arizona are on
a salary basis." By constitutional provision in Louisiana and South
Carolina, the justices receive a salary instead of fees in criminal cases.'4
Legislatures have used indirect methods of impairing the jurisdic-
tion of the justices of the peace, either by taking away from the justices
practically all civil and criminal jurisdiction, where the legislature is
empowered to do so, or by creating other types of minor courts with
concurrent jurisdiction. There has been a tendency in recent years
to establish municipal courts, small claims courts, and juvenile and
domestic relations courts in towns and cities, with the result of
reducing materially or abolishing the jurisdiction of justices. 5 In
some instances these courts have jurisdiction over a considerable area
adjacent to the town or city, or even throughout the county. Where
county courts are established, they in some cases supersede justices
of the peace courts; in most instances the county courts exist alongside
justices' courts.
In Ohio the system of compensation whereby the remuneration of
justices of the peace is directly dependent on the outcome of criminal
cases before them was the subject of attack on constitutional grounds
in the Tumey case. The result of the holding in that case is that a
judge is disqualified, on grounds of personal interest, where he receives
12 California Code of Civil Procedure (1915), Sec. 102(b).
13 "The Constitutionality of Fee Compensation for Courts," 36 Yale Law
Jour., 1171-75 (1926-27).
14 Louisiana constitution (1921), Sec. 50; South Carolina constitution (1895),
Art. V, Sec. 20.
ls Reginald H. Smith, Justice and the Poor (N. Y., 1919).
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his fees only if the defendant is convicted." Apparently this decision
has been largely responsible for two immediate results in Ohio, first,
the enactment of a statute designed to save to the justices of the
peace their fees in spite of the holding in the Tumey case, and
secondly, a definite move on the part of the bar of the state for the
establishment of a system of uniform inferior courts.
Senate Bill No. 72 enacted by the 1927 session of the Ohio legis-
lature amends the General Code on the matter of fees for justices of
the peace in criminal proceedings. 7 Under the terms of this act the
justices of the peace are required to pay into the treasury of the county
all fees collected in state criminal cases in which the magistrate has
final jurisdiction. Once a month the magistrate and other officers
receive as compensation from the county general fund an amount
equal to the sum-total of fees earned by them in such cases. It is
doubtful whether the objection of the Tumey case is met by such an
expedient.
A committee of the Ohio State Bar Association made a report on
June 19, 1928, in which it recommends the passage of a bill by the
legislature to create a rural court in each of the counties of the state.',
In each county this rural court, a court of record, would succeed
to the powers, duties, and jurisdiction of justices of the peace." The
"rural judge," who must be a practicing lawyer of three years' experi-
ence, and one or more magistrates are to be elected in each county;
the judge, by the electors of the county outside municipal court dis-
tricts; the magistrates, by the electors of magisterial districts, each
such district to contain eight thousand to eighteen thousand inhabi-
tants. The only requirements for magistrates are that they must be
of good moral character and electors of the magisterial districts. The
judge, magistrates, and constables are to be paid by salary, all fees
being paid into the general county fund. The seat of the rural court
is to be at the county court house, although provision is made that
the rural judge, or a magistrate at the direction of the judge, may
hold court at any place in the rural district where so doing would
contribute to the convenience of the parties or to the ends of justice.
Under this plan the fee system would disappear. If there were a real
supervision of the magistrates by the rural judge, the system would
have obvious merits.
* Tumey v. Ohio, 47 U. S., 437, decided March 7, 1927.
' Laws of Ohio, 1927, p. 269.
n Committee on Establishment of Uniform Inferior Courts.
19 Constitution of Ohio (1851), Art. 4, Sec. 9, as amended Sept. 3, 1912.
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Something has already been done in Ohio toward replacing justices
of the peace. Over a score of the large cities have for many years had
municipal courts which, speaking generally, have jurisdiction not only
in the city where they sit, but also in the township or in a district
composed of one or more townships. These courts exercise the juris-
diction usually held by justices of the peace.
In Virginia, cities, for the most part, are excluded from the juris-
diction of the county governments, and the problem of the justice of the
peace is essentially rural. The constitution requires that "the General
Assembly shall provide for the appointment or election and for the
jurisdiction of such justices of the peace as the public interests may
require," 0 and the usual system of justices of the peace courts has
been established by legislation. Recent acts passed by the Virginia
Assembly make a beginning toward reform in the justice of the peace
system. The act establishing juvenile and domestic relations courts
in cities of twenty-five thousand or more inhabitants, with concurrent
jurisdiction with justices of the peace within and one mile beyond the
corporate limits of the city,2 ' and the act permitting counties to have
trial justices appointed by the circuit court2 are indicative of the trend.
Even more important in Virginia is the legislation of 1926 permitting
the establishment for certain counties of courts with powers com-
parable to those of civil and police justices of the cities.23 Chester-
field county has adopted the system provided for by this legislation.
The trial justice appointed in this county holds court weekly in several
places in the county, and sits in the more sparsely settled portions
once a month. The Virginia act of 1926 is optional and is unlikely
to solve promptly the justice of the peace problem throughout the
state.
A Kansas statute passed in 1927 establishes city courts in Kansas
City to take over the jurisdiction of justices of the peace courts, not
only in the city, but throughout the county in which the city is situ-
ated.2' A statute of the same year provides for judges for every town-
ship located in a county having a population of one hundred thousand
to one hundred twenty-five thousand, and these judges have the
jurisdiction formerly exercised by justices of the peace.2' The act
so Constitution of Virginia (1902), Sec. 108.
s1 General Laws of Virginia, 1923, Ch. 81.
' Virginia Code, 1924, Sees. 4988-4988 (29).
2 Acts of Virginia Assembly, 1926, Ch. 511.
*4 Laws of Kansas, 1927, Ch. 180.
U Ibid., Ch. 182.
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provides that justices of the peace of such townships shall have no
jurisdiction over any case, civil or criminal, "except in civil actions
for the recovery of money only where the amount claimed, exclusive
of costs, does not exceed the sum of one dollar."" The provisions of
this act may be adopted by any cities of the first class, or by cities of
the second class having over thirteen thousand inhabitants. The
judges of these courts must be lawyers of five years' practice.
In Mississippi a 1926 statute establishes a county court in each
county having a population exceeding thirty-five thousand, or, not
having such a population, if it has an assessed valuation of real and
personal property exceeding seventeen million dollars, and in either
event containing a municipality of five thousand or more inhabitants
as shown by the federal census of 1920.27 Any other county in the
state may establish a county court. The judges of the county courts
must have the qualifications required for judges of the circuit and
chancery courts.
The Mississippi county courts have jurisdiction concurrent with
justices of the peace in all matters, civil and criminal; they are given
exclusively the jurisdiction previously exercised by justices of the peace
in eminent domain, in the partition of personal property, and in actions
of unlawful entry and detainer. In addition, the county courts have
concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court in misdemeanor cases,
and concurrent jurisdiction with circuit and chancery courts in all
cases where the principal amount involved is one thousand dollars or
less, excluding divorce and alimony, matters testamentary and of
administration, minors' business, cases of idiocy, lunacy, and persons
of unsound mind.
Ten of the eighty-two counties of Mississippi come within the
classification in which the establishment of the county court is made
mandatory. Three Other counties have by election adopted the system,
while three counties by election rejected a proposal to establish it.28
The Mississippi county courts take a good part of the work from
justices of the peace. It is believed that if the court held sessions in
each of the five supervisors' districts of the county, instead of at the
6 In re Greer (1879), 58 Kans. 268, 48 Pac. 950, the constitutionality of a
similar statute was upheld. But see contra, St. ex. rel. Burke v. Hinkel (1911),
144 Wis. 444, 129 N.W. 393.
27 Laws of Mississippi, 1926, Ch. 131.
2 Biennial Report of the Secretary of State of Mississippi (1926-27), pp. 156-
157 (figures are as of May 31, 1927).
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county court-house alone, the court would rapidly supplant the
justices of the peace.
In Wisconsin, although there has been no amendment of statutes
relating directly to justice of the peace courts since the code of 1898,
nevertheless these courts have gradually lost much of their former
importance. This has been accomplished in part by the creation of
special municipal courts, and in other cases by conferring much of the
statutory jurisdiction of the justice of the peace upon county courts.
The acts creating county courts frequently deprive the justices of the
peace of a given county of all criminal jurisdiction and frequently,
also, of most of their civil jurisdiction. In Milwaukee county, by special
statute, there is only one justice of the peace,and he has been deprived
of practically all jurisdiction, though he retains the right to perform
marriage ceremonies. A special district court has been created for
Milwaukee county, with substantially the criminal jurisdiction of the
old justices of the peace courts, and a number of special civil courts
set up in the county have relieved the justices of their civil jurisdiction.
There are also in Wisconsin thirty-four municipal courts and two supe-
rior courts, with jurisdiction co-extensive with that of justices of the
peace. In the greater part of the state, however, the old system of
justices of the peace remains in effect."9
In Maryland a 1927 statute provides for legally trained judges to
serve as justices of the peace for Allegheny county. Two courts,
known as "the people's courts," have been provided; they have juris-
diction over minor criminal matters and in civil cases involving not
over three hundred dollars. 0
The system of minor courts existing in Hawaii is of interest. The
organic act vests the judicial power of the territory in "one supreme
court, circuit courts, and in such inferior courts as the legislature may
from time to time establish."" Twenty-seven judicial districts have
been created 2 The chief justice of the supreme court of the territory
appoints one or more magistrates for each judicial district. They must
be lawyers, and they may be removed by the supreme court. The magis-
trates have exclusive jurisdiction in civil matters involving amounts
up to fifty dollars, and concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts
" Wisconsin Statutes, 1927, Vol. 1, Chs. 253 and 254; Laws of Wisconsin,
1909, Ch. 549; Laws of Wisconsin, 1913, Ch. 702.
* Laws of Maryland, 1927, pp. 521-530.
n1 Chap. IV, Sec. 81.
* Revised Laws of Hawaii, 1925, Vol. 1, Chs. 14 and 137.
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in cases involving amounts up to five hundred dollars. Their criminal
jurisdiction extends to offenses punishable by fine or by fine and
imprisonment not exceeding one year. Each magistrate must make an
annual report to the chief justice of the supreme court of the territory.
The magistrate of the Honolulu district receives an annual salary of
$4,800; the other twenty-six districts, with four exceptions, pay an
annual salary of $1,200 or more.
Three methods of solving the justice of the peace situation present
themselves: (1) the office may be abolished outright; (2) other types
of minor courts may be created alongside the justices of the peace
courts, with jurisdiction similar to that exercised by the justices; (3)
there may be a limitation of the number of justices and the abolition
of the fee system. Abolition 1of the office of justice of the peace may
be accomplished by (1) constitutional provision directly abolishing
the office, (2) constitutional provision or amendment authorizing
the legislature to abolish the office, followed by legislative enact-
ment, (3) legislation abolishing the office, in the few states where under
present constitutional provision that is possible, (4) legislation taking
away all, or practically all, jurisdiction and vesting such jurisdiction in
other courts. This fourth method of indirect replacement is now being
actively employed. Justices of the peace are, however, likely to con-
tinue in most of the states, and the evils of the justice system in such
states may largely be met by abolishing the fee system, by reducing
the number and jurisdiction of justices, and by setting up a more
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